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Abstract
The recent and massive deployment of Voice over IP infrastructures had raised the importance of the VoIP security
and more precisely of the underlying signalisation protocol SIP. In this paper, we will present a new attack against the
authentication mechanism of SIP. This attack allows to perform toll fraud and call hijacking. We will detail the formal
specification method that allowed to detect this vulnerability, highlight a simple usage case and propose a mitigation
technique.
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1 Introduction
SIP is the IETF endorsed signaling protocol for VoIP. The developers of SIP leveraged well proven design concepts
from HTTP to build a robust and multi-feature signaling protocol. The advance of highly dynamical services deployed
over multimedia enabled networks and end user equipment had to be matched by an appropriate signaling protocol.
At the basics, SIP allows to create, maintain and tear down a media session. The media session is represented by an
RTP encoded audio/video data. The specific characteristics of this RTP flow are negotiated by SIP. In the simplest
case, the call establishment with SIP has to be able to let the two communicating partners send RTP data between their
two locations. However, in the more complex case, some additional features have to be supported. Call forwarding is
the simplest feature that has to be supported. Renegotiating a media stream parameters (RTP) is also a minimum. For
instance, in case of network congestion, another codec can be used. In order to support these features the so-called
re-INVITE operation has to be used. The re-INVITE is issued during an already existing session and in order to avoid
a call-hijacking attack, the receiver is allowed to challenge the sender to authenticate. Ironically, it is this security
feature that can be abused to bypass the authentication mechanisms used in SIP network. We will show in this paper
why the re-INVITE operation is a major threat to any SIP network and how a simple grandmaster attack is possible
due to it.
To examine SIP protocol security we have used AVISPA tool. AVISPA is a push-button tool for the Automated
Validation of Internet Security Protocols [1]. It provides a modular and expressive formal language, HLPSL (The
High-Level Protocol Specification Language) for specifying protocols and their security properties, and integrates
different back-ends that implement a variety of state-of-the-art automatic analysis techniques. Experimental results,
carried out on a large library of Internet security protocols, indicate that the AVISPA Tool is a state-of-the-art tool for
automatic verification of security protocols.
2 SIP Vulnerability
When SIP is deployed without any underling cryptographic protection mechanism, the typical man in the middle
and impersonation attacks between a caller and its proxy, (see Figure 1) are straightforward. However, these must are
constrained by some important factors . Firstly, the attacker willing to impersonate the user has to be in the middle of
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Figure 1. Authentication Attack
the session path and be able to manipulate the session traffic. Secondly, the attacker cannot trigger the user to make
such a call at a specific time. Finally, the attacker is restricted to use the generated response just to call the entity for
which the user directed the call. In other words, the attacker is not able to call an entity of its choice.
During a testing process [2] carried out by us, we have discovered a scenario in which the user is reachable by the
attacker and the latest can trigger the former to generate an INVITE + credentials1 (directed to any target destination).
This allows an attacker to impersonate the user at the Proxy for any call. Therefore, the attacker can bypass the
previous restrictions and make this attack a real security threat.
The synopsis is as follow: an attacker will issue a call directly to the victim, the victim answers and later on, puts
the attacker on hold (transfers him to any other place or uses any other method which requires a re-INVITE). Once
the attacker receives the re-INVITE specifying the ”On hold”, he will immediately request the victim to authenticate.
This last authentication may be used by the attacker to impersonate the victim at its own proxy. Section 3 formalizes
and describes in detail this attack.
Note, that to perform this attack, there are two headers in the INVITE message that are essential. The Contact
header has to have the destination call that the attacker wants to call, because, as specified by SIP [7], this information
will be used to generate the message by the user entity. The Record-Route header specifies that all outgoing messages
from the user entity go directly to that entity.
3 SIP and HLPSL Specification
HLPSL is an expressive, modular, role-based, formal language that allows for the specification of control-flow
patterns, data-structures, alternative intruder models, complex security properties, as well as different cryptographic
primitives and their algebraic properties. These features make HLPSL well suited for specifying modern, industrial-
scale protocols. For instance it has been applied to ZRTP flaws discovery in [5].
1 http://voipsa.org/pipermail/voipsec_voipsa.org/2007-November/002475.html
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Figure 2. SIP scenario 1
3.1 SIP scenarios
We have formalized two typical scenarios of SIP protocol. In both scenarios Caller wants to call Callee. The
first one is shown in Figure 2: Caller is registered on Proxy and wants to call via his proxy, then Proxy requests an
authentication of Caller.
The second case (shown in Figure 3): Callee is available only through Proxy where Callee is registered. Callee puts
conversation on hold by sending invite during the conversation. Having received this invite, Proxy can demand an
authentication of Callee.
3.2 SIP in HLPSL
In order to describe the protocol we should specify the actions of each kind of participant, i.e. the basic roles. To
describe both above scenarios in HLPSL we introduce three basic roles: caller, callee, and proxy. Each role
is obtained by merging corresponding roles from the two scenarios defined in 3.1 (this means Caller from Scenario 1
and Caller from Scenario 2 became one role and similarly for Callee and Proxy).
We present now the declaration of basic roles and their parameters in HLPSL:
role caller(A,B,P : agent, Apasswd : text,
SND, RCV : channel (dy))
· · ·
role proxy(P : agent,
Keyring : (agent.text) set,
Realm : text,
SND, RCV : channel (dy))
· · ·
role callee(B,P : agent, Bpasswd : text,
SND, RCV : channel (dy))
· · ·
Here we have: A, B, P - agents playing rolescaller, callee and proxy respectively;Apasswd, Bpasswd
- passwords of agent A and B respectively; RCV, SND are channels for sending and receiving messages andKeyring
— set of pairs <username, password>.
In HLPSL variable names start with capital letters; constants, keywords and types start with lower-case letters. The
primed variable notation (e.g.: X’) indicates that a new value is assigned to the variable.
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Figure 3. SIP scenario 2
To execute several roles in parallel, the composition is presented in HLPSL. We defined two sessions (composi-
tions): out_session (for a call by Scenario 1) and in_session (for a call by Scenario 2).
role in_session(A, B, P : agent,
Keyring: (agent.text) set, Bpasswd : text)
· · ·
composition
caller(A,B,P, null, SA,RA) /\
callee(B,P, Bpasswd, SB,RB) /\
proxy(P, Keyring, realm, SP,RP)
end role
role out_session(A, B, P : agent,
Keyring: (agent.text) set, Apasswd : text)
· · ·
composition
caller(A,B, P, Apasswd, SA,RA) /\
callee(B,P, null, SB,RB) /\
proxy( P, Keyring, realm, SP,RP)
end role
Symbol /\ denotes here a parallel execution.
Now we show the transitions of roles that are responsible for the authentication part. A transition — is a rule that
can fire if the left-hand side2 is satisfied. For role Caller:
getAuth.
State=10 /\
RCV(A.B.CallID.auth. Algorithm’.Realm’.Nonce’) =|> State’:=20 /\
SND(A.B.CallID.ack)
This transition is called getAuth and its left-hand side means: “if value of variable State equals to 10 and
we receive on channel RCV message equal to concatenation of values of variables A, B, CallID, constant auth
2 before “=|>”
and three more values that are to be assigned to variables Algorithm, Realm and Nonce”; the right-hand
side means: “then assign 20 to the variable State and send via channel SND concatenation of values stored in
A,B,CallID and constant ack”. In other words, getAuth stands for getting hash-function name (Algorithm),
realm value (Realm) and nonce (Nonce), and as a response Caller sends ack3.
sndResponce.
State=20 /\ RCV(start) =|> State’:=30 /\ Cnonce’:=new() /\ MdC’:=Algorithm(
Algorithm(A.Realm.Apasswd). Nonce.Cnonce’.Algorithm(invite.B)) /\
SND(A.invite.B.CallID.Algorithm. Realm.Nonce.MdC’.Cnonce’) /\ witness(A,P,
client_md,MdC’)
In this transition caller emits an authentication response. caller generates a new nonce Cnonce and com-
putes a message digest value MdC (exactly like shown in HLPSL specification above). Then caller sends this value
together with others. The last line is an authentication event witness. Here it should be read as follows:
getProxyAuthInfo.
State=30 /\ RCV (A.B.CallID.MdP’.ok) /\ MdP’=Algorithm(Algorithm(
A.Realm.Apasswd). Nonce.Cnonce.Algorithm(B)) =|> State’:=40 /\ SND
(A.B.CallID.ack) /\ request(A,P, proxy_md, MdP’)
The getProxyAuthInfo transition checks authentication credentials received from the proxy. If it is correct —
sends ack signal. Here we have the second authentication-related event request; it means “A accepts the value
MdP’ and relies on the guarantee that agent P exists and agrees with A on this value”
Now we show some Proxy’s transitions responsible for the authentication procedure with Caller:
getInviteSndAuth.
State=11 /\ RCV(X’.invite.Y’.CallID’) /\ in(X’.PasswdX’, Keyring) =|> State’:=21
/\ Nonce’:=new() /\ SND(X’.Y’.CallID’. auth.md5.Realm.Nonce’)
Transition getInviteSndAuth. At first we receive information about who wants to call (X’) and to whom
(Y’). The next condition tells that X’ should be registered in this proxy, i.e. the pair X.password_of_X should
belong to the keyring set. This is achieved by in(X’.PasswdX’, Keyring) statement. X’ is already defined,
so if there is a pair X’.something in Keyring, then the value of “something” is assigned to variable PasswdX’.
checkAuth.
State=31 /\ RCV(X.invite.Y.CallID.md5. Realm.Nonce.MdC’.Cnonce’) /\
MdC’=md5( md5(X.Realm.PasswdX). Nonce.Cnonce’.md5(invite.Y)) =|> State’:=41 /\
SND(X.invite.Y.CallID) /\ request(P, X, client_md,MdC’)
Transition checkAuth checks if received authentication credentials are right and if they are, sends invite to callee.
sndProxyAuthInfo.
State=41 /\ RCV(X.Y.CallID.ok) =|> State’:=51 /\ MdP’:=md5(md5(X.Realm.PasswdX)
.Nonce.Cnonce.md5(Y)) /\ SND (X.Y.CallID.MdP’.ok) /\ witness(P, X, proxy_md,MdP’)
Here we get ok from callee and send proxy authentication information to caller.
We skip the HLPSL-specification of the role callee and the rest of proxy’s authentication related specification
as it is very similar to the one described above.
There is a special role environment, that it is a top-level one (it is “called” from HLPSL file) where we declare
agents and other constants, all the sessions to be executed simultaneously and where we define an initial intruder
knowledge set using intruder_knowledge token. Here we initially let the intruder know the following constants:
a, b, p, c, invite, try, ringing, ok, ack, auth, in other words he knows all agents names and
all SIP methods.
To make AVISPA tool search for an attack, one should introduce a goals section to define security goals:
goal
authentication_on proxy_md
authentication_on client_md
...
end goal
For example, the first line is a command that makes AVISPA tool look for an authentication attack for the witness-
request pair defined by constant proxy_md.
Now we can start AVISPA Tool. An attack is detected when the following role composition is presented in the
top-role environment:
proxy(p, Keyring, realm, SP,RP) /\
callee(a,p, alice_passwd, SB,RB)
3Notice: all the messages in our specification constantly contain from, to and CallID part. We omit mentions about this part
And Keyring contains the only pair a.alice_passwd. But we can also use two defined compositions (which
include necessary roles):
out_session(a,c,p,Keyring,alice_passwd)
/\ in_session(b,a,p,Keyring,alice_passwd)
3.3 MSC of attack
When running AVISPA tool on our HLPSL specification of SIP we get the message: “UNSAFE”. The tool auto-
matically builds and displays the attack trace in Figure 4.
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Figure 4. Attack trace
Here x236, x265 and x237 are variables that can take any values. Notation Cnonce(7) indicates an instance
of a Cnonce variable (the parameter is used to distinguish one instance of the variable from another).
We can see that at first the intruder impersonates caller a when speaking to proxy. After getting an authentication
challenge from proxy and sending ack, the intruder starts a protocol execution with a. Here the intruder impersonates
a proxy for callee a. Once the intruder gets the necessary authentication response from callee a, he reuses it (the
only change is CallID value) to answer proxy’s challenge he got at the beginning. Here we get a security violation on
authentication, as an appropriate witness event was not generated to match the request event that is produced.
Table 1. Benchmark
proxy(p, Keyring, realm, SP,RP)
/\bob(a,p, alice passwd, SB,RB)
Keyring sip sip’
a.caller passwd 0.07s, unsafe 0.06s, safe
a.caller passwd,
c.charley passwd,
i.i passwd
0.07s, unsafe 0.07s, safe
Table 2. Benchmark 2
out_session(a,c,p,Keyring,alice_passwd)
/\in_session(b,a,p,Keyring,alice_passwd)
Keyring sip sip’
a.caller passwd 0.39s, unsafe 11.81s, safe
a.caller passwd,
c.charley passwd,
i.i passwd
0.40s, unsafe 13785.07s, safe
4 Mitigation
Authentication challenges in SIP are computed using pieces of information extracted from the authenticate message
plus the username and shared secret. In the simplest case the authentication response is computed by:
A1 = username ":" realm ":" passwd
A2 = Method ":" Digest-URI
resp = MD5(MD5(A1) ":" nonce ":" MD5(A2))
where resp is the actual authentication response. Thus, the computed authentication responses will be rejected if
the method of the message is different than the method used to generate the response.
However, the described attack abuses that restriction due to the fact that SIP defines an INVITE method which can
be used in different contexts (i.e. for initiation of a session and renegotiation). Therefore, the variable A2 is the same
in both contexts. If different methods names are used for those contexts, then the generated authentication response
cannot be used for such an attack.
We propose a mitigation that consists in defining the re-INVITE method as a proper method with a new name:
RE-INVITE. Note that computed authentication for such message will use the RE-INVITE method in the variable
A2 rather than INVITE. Thus, it will generate an authentication token useful only for re-INVITEs messages. Our
proposed solution is simple and it should not require to much modifications in the overall protocol.
Validation The proposed patch changes the scenario 2 (see fig. 3) such that every invite appearing after comment
“Callee presses hold” is changed for reinvite. So it is not difficult to change HLPSL specification taking into
account the proposed patch.
We ran AVISPA tool over “patched” HLPSL specification. For the patched version we got “safe” over the sessions
which were unsafe for original version. Tables 1 and 2 represent a running time in seconds of AVISPA-tool with cl-atse
backend and safety result depending on sessions and value of Keyring variable. Column sip represents the original
version of SIP and sip’ — the patched one.
5 Related Work
The comprehensive overview on VoIP security is the reference [11] addressing the operational and deployment
aspects of VoIP security. The security mechanisms deployed in SIP are well described in [6] without covering the
formal aspect of the security architecture.
Many works have been dedicated to analysis and testing of VoIP protocols, but dealing either with the PSTN in-
terconnection as in [9], or [8]. Most of the performed work has addressed the prevention of SPAM over Internet
Telephony (SPIT) attacks [3] as well as mitigating denial of service ones (DOS) [10]. Very few of them did ad-
dress the cryptographic analysis of the protocol itself. Among the very few which did, most of them are based on
human-analysis of the protocol. As of today, very few works address the formal specification and analysis of security
properties. Among them — a thorough study of ZRTP (VoIP media transport layer protocol) using AVISPA tool [5],
has allowed to find a new authentication attack. There are two families of potential attacks that can be performed
against SIP. The first class of attacks is possible when no cryptographic protections are used in the SIP deployment.
For instance, a DoS attack on SIP protocol has also been exhibited using a Petri nets modelling in [12] — using faked
BYE message and showed an established conversation can be turned down prematurely [4]. Until now, the authen-
tication and authorization mechanisms in SIP were considered sound, and such that only denial of service and brute
force attacks were possible. We have disclosed some attacks against specific implementations (CVE-2007-5468, CVE-
2007-5469), where cryptographic tokens could be reused or even fixed, but these were due to software implementation
flaws and not really SIP specification level vulnerabilities. Our paper is the first to show a structural flaw in the SIP
authentication mechanism itself due to the feature interaction in SIP.
6 Conclusion
We have presented in this paper a new attack against the SIP authentication mechanisms. This attack is extremely
dangerous since SIP is worldwide deployed and no solution to mitigate this attack exists. We have confirmed this
vulnerability using AVISPA tool and shown that extending SIP with one more operation can mitigate this attack. The
solution has been automatically validated by the tool. It is a follow-up activity to fully specify SIP and completely
analyze its behavior, but many scalability issues must be solved to achieve this task.
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